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In this paper, we mathematically model and analyze occurrence of trade disputes in the 
context of a petroleum supply chain network which includes a seller, a buyer and an arbitrator. We 
study how switching from conventional trading system to a blockchain-based system could help 
decrease the number of disputes while maintaining the profitability of trading. Specifically, we 
determine what is the optimal timing to switch to blockchain technology through arbitrator’s 
perspective under petroleum price uncertainty. The way blockchain technology aids trade 
irrefutability is to provide a secure and immutable distributed ledger which ensures each trade is 
recorded and timestamped with no participant being able to alter the transactions history. 
Consequently, participants trading in a safe network, can trust the system and conduct transactions 
more securely. Currently, around nine percent of crude oil transactions are disputed, which equates 
to around USD 150 billion each year. In a petroleum trading network, the disputes filed by either 
seller or buyer are consequences of fraud and/or error. Studies have shown, integrating Blockchain 
technology into trading network significantly reduces the probability of transactions disputes and 
trades recorded on a blockchain distributed ledger has higher finality rates.  
Although there has been much interest in blockchain technology applicable to petroleum 
industry supply chain, there has been little analytical investigation of irrefutability, one of the 
critical attributes of the blockchain technology. Irrefutability corresponds to a network 
characteristic which prevents any participant to question the integrity of transactions recorded on 
ledger and any future disputes. Throughout this work, we aim to show how irrefutability can be 
valued, in the context of petroleum industry supply chain, from a perspective of stochastic optimal 
control. We will show how petroleum strike prices for switching to blockchain technology can be 





to demonstrate under what conditions it is economically feasible from arbitrator’s perspective to 
implement a blockchain technology by modeling number of disputes as a function of system’s 
reliability. Even though at a first glance arbitrator may have no reason to favor blockchain over 
traditional system because of decrease in dispute resolution payments due to increased trade 
finality, on the other hand we conclude a profit for arbitrator which is sourced in higher transaction 






 GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
Oil and gas are sold in large volumes and as such entail significant value, not unlike the 
size and scale of transaction between banks (Tordo, et al., 2011). The frequency of transactions is 
also high; for example, according to (Siddiqui, et al., 2013) a 300,000 barrel per day oil refinery 
will need to source a large crude carrier every week to maintain adequate volumes and cargos can 
cost as much as USD 100 million (two million barrels at USD 50 per barrel). Oil companies also 
need to be aware of where the crude oil is sourced. Some exporting nations such as IRAN are 
subject to sanctions to prevent trade for this commodity. These sanctions often impel such nations 
to make transactions through private entities which frequently result in fraud. Non-transparent 
transactions are often exposed to lack of intractability (Torbat, 2005).  
In petroleum industry, companies often incur significant costs to ensure that every 
participant in a trading network behaves in accordance to the pre-defined contract. Most overhead 
costs belong to reduction in misunderstandings, disputes and fraud. Writing and tracking all the 
contracts, compliance forms, reporting and monitoring, audit trails are examples of efforts to 
ensure the system integrity in presence of a third party as an arbitrator. According to (Ghandi & 
Lin, 2014) by recording the information of the participants, locations, commodity type and real-
time measured value on the blockchain, dispute resolution can be done in a consolidate manner 
instead of reconciling disparate databases. Disputes are direct outcomes of violation of some 
clauses of an agreements between parties involved in a trade if the accused party fails to recognize 
the fault (Aniello, et al., 2016). Utilizing a third party as the dispute resolution method is associated 
with fees involved for each transaction and trust issues. In the context of petroleum industry, oil 





which ultimately resulted in reduction in exploration, production and supply efforts (Pirog, 2012). 
Due to these factors, oil and gas companies have been forced to re-design their supply chain 
management and how they incorporate technology in their transaction processing system 
(Papageorgiou. 2009) 
Petroleum trading system is a complex network where higher degree of trust is essential 
due to the sensitivity of transactions. Large volume transactions and high value shipments require 
the trading system to be secure. Trust is crucial in petroleum supply chain and any effort to default 
on agreements will result in the transaction to be terminated. This delicacy leads any trading system 
to include a third party to oversee the transactions and intervene on every occasion that system is 
alarmed. The third party could be assigned as a government or private entity. According to Melese 
(2010) “The objective of firms doing business with the government is to maximize profits. The 
intent of a protest system is to provide a decentralized governance mechanism to oversee the 
integrity, equity, and efficiency of the procurement process. Although, government’s intent is for 
protesters to act as a type of third-party oversight of government buyers (procurement officials, 
etc.), the reality is that because protesters themselves are in competition as sellers, they have 
conflicting objectives.” 
In recent years, Blockchain technology has been introduced as a decentralized governance 
mechanism with features such as immutability, irrefutability and integrity (Hyvärinen, et al., 2017) 
However, conditions under which blockchain technology would be feasible and possess value to 
be implemented to reduce the number of protests in bidding processes, have not been studied.  
According to Melese (2010), there is only one way a bidder (seller) can win a protest: the 
protest must have merit and be sustained given that it has merit. 𝑃" Is the probability that a protest 





Melese (2010) 𝑃# Is positively correlated with errors, E, and fraud, F. So, any efforts to reduce 
fraud and/or errors will reduce the probability a protest has merit and, reduce the expected benefits 
of a protest. Likewise, 𝑃$ Is positively correlated with fraud and error whereas it is negatively 
correlated with the price, P, offered by the bidder.  
Blockchain technology primarily targets industries and government processes where there 
is an abundancy of human and traditional databases errors and fraudulent attempts to alter the 
records (Mohammed, et al., 2012) and (Hilborn, 2013).Hence, this technology is an optimal 
candidate to prevent such behaviors, which will result in reducing the expected benefit of protests 
and increasing the associated cost with protests. To achieve this goal, blockchain technology aims 
at ensuring the transparency and accountability of the evaluation and selection process and 
substituting an immutable record of transactions where probability of fraud is insignificant 
(Angraal, et al., 2017).  
In a petroleum trading network, the participants will protest about 10% of trades which 
results in trade disputes (Wang, et al., 2011). The disputes are direct outcome of fraud and/or error. 
Any effort to reduce the probability of fraud and/or error will result in increasing trade finality, 
lowering the number of protests. 
In the traditional settings and absence of blockchain technology, employ a trusted-third 
party (TTP) which is responsible of checking if every participant complies with pre-determined 
agreements. Disputes are usually resolved by this entity as well. In these setting, third party is 
considered as the single point of failure and needs to be trusted at all stages over the trading period. 

















Oil and gas contracting can be complex, with lengthy contracts and agreements (Capper, 
2010). Smart contracts are self-executing contracts based on agreed criteria and written in code, 
removing the ambiguity of terms and reducing the requirement for lawyers to draft and interpret. 
When the criteria of the contract are fulfilled, ownership or payment, for example, will be  
 














Figure 2 – Blockchain-based Setting 





Trading commodities such as petroleum based on a blockchain technology results in 
technology, inventories, contracts, payments and other data being shared directly between parties 
with encrypted connections (Rahmadika, et al., 2018). Commodity exchanges on blockchain, for 
example, can support oil and gas trading directly between parties anywhere in the world, while 
removing the role banks, brokerage firms or other intermediaries have traditionally played. The oil 
and gas industry present a particularly compelling opportunity to leverage blockchain technologies 
due to the high transactional values (and therefore risks) and economic pressures to reduce costs 
(Idachaba, 2012). 
The reason for the interest in Blockchain is its central attributes that provide security, 
anonymity and data integrity without any third-party organization in control of the transactions. 
Blockchains allow us to have a distributed peer-to-peer network where non-trusting members can 
interact with each other without a trusted intermediary, in a verifiable manner. Blockchain 
technology is a distributed ledger to share information equally among all the participants. The 
information shared included is but not limited to financial transaction data, legal contracts, deeds 
of ownership and identity documentation. The recorded information is stored on a ledger that is 
distributed across every node (i.e. Participant’s computer) in a network. The blockchain 
technology provides the data encryption that many entities seek to ensure that the data is not prone 
to any malicious attacks or breach. Historical transactions in the Blockchain may not be deleted or 
altered without invalidating the chain of hashes since each block is “chained” back to the previous 
block by containing a hash representation of the previous block. 
Furthermore, blockchain technology creates a clear audit trail of time-stamped data as 
documented blocks that could be accessed by authorities for taxation and audit purposes. Due to 





broadcasted, it will become tamper proof and any future attempts to alter the history of the ledger 
would result in total change in the chain which is computationally exhaustive and impractical. 
Blockchain could provide a fully transparent and secure record of the entire supply chain. Oil and 
gas contracting can be complex, with lengthy contracts and agreements. Smart contracts are self-
executing contracts based on agreed criteria and written in code, removing the ambiguity of terms 
and reducing the requirement for lawyers to draft and interpret. When the criteria of the contract 
are fulfilled, ownership or payment, for example, will be automatically transferred.  
To mention several Blockchain based systems major characteristics, the following are the 
most important ones: 
• Data immutability which depends on the consensus mechanism when the transaction is 
taken to be committed/confirmed  
• Traceability 
• Irrefutability (of transactions): provided by the immutable chain of cryptographically-
signed historical transactions  
Other major characteristics include but not limited to Integrity, Transparency, and equal 
rights. As previously discussed blockchain-based trading networks ensure integral traceability, 
fight fraud and minimize the system errors as it provides traceability of rice by recording all the 
events happening in the supply chain. As any other revolutionary technology, Blockchain has 
major technical drawbacks. In this section we mention a number of limitations that need further 
study and continuous improvement: 
• Privacy: no privileged user, every participant can join the network to access all the 






• Scalability: capability of the system to handle a growing amount of data (transactions): 
a. The size of the data on Blockchain 
b. The transaction processing rate 
c. The latency of data transmission 
Blockchain technology is categorized into two main types: Permissioned and Permission-
less. Permission-less technology such as cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc.) Incorporates 
the benefit of the doubt among the participants. It is a trust-less system where anyone has the 
permission to enter, write and read on the network. On the other hand, permissioned blockchain 
such as IBM Hyperledger sets limited access for players in the network based on their participation 
purpose. For example, a seller might have full permission on read and write to the ledger but not 
given access to verify the transactions, which is instead done by a third party (arbitrator). Due to 
the high transaction value and security issues, the petroleum trading network studied in this work 
belongs to permissioned blockchain with limited number of participants.  
First generation Blockchains like Bitcoin have limited capability to support programmable 
transactions while second generation 
blockchains such as Ethereum 
provide a general-purpose 
programmable infrastructure with a 
public ledger that records the 
computational results. In addition to 
programmable transactions, second 
generation blockchain support smart 
contracts which are programs 
Figure 3 - Overall workflow of a 
Distributed Ledger  






deployed and run on a distributed ledger network. Smart contracts can express triggers, conditions 
and business logic embedded in transactions. Now let us review transaction lifecycle in a 
blockchain technology. We will discuss how a transaction is published by one of the participants, 
verified by members and broadcasted through the network by all members. Ultimately, being 











Buyer submits a transaction proposal (10 barrels of oil @ $60/barrel) for Smart Contract. It must 
target the required peers {E0, E1, E2} and not others {P3, P4}. Through endorsement policy, which 
describes the conditions by which a transaction can be endorsed. A transaction can only be 
considered valid if it has been endorsed according to its policy. Each chain-code is associated with 
an Endorsement Policy. In this case, it is stated that E0, E1 and E2 must sign while P3, P4 are not 
part of the policy. Later on, E0, E1 and E2 will each execute the proposed transaction. None of these 
executions will update the ledger. Each execution will capture the set of Read and Written data, 
called RW sets, which will now flow in the fabric. Transactions can be signed & encrypted. The 
source: IBM Hyperledger Fabric 
 





RW sets are signed by each endorser, and also includes each record version number. (This 
information will be checked much later in the consensus process also known as verification.)	
Ordering service collects transactions 
into proposed blocks for distribution to 
committing peers. Peers can deliver to 
other peers in a hierarchy (not shown)  
 
 
All participants verify transactions 
Every committing peer verifies 
against the endorsement policy. Verified 
transactions are applied to world state 
and retained on the ledger. Not verified 
transactions are also retained on the 
ledger but do not update world state. 
After the buyer proposal has been 
posted on a block, the same workflow is 
applied to seller proposal. All the steps 
are identical in validation and 
verification.  
  
Source: IBM Hyperledger Fabric 
Source: IBM Hyperledger Fabric 
Figure 5 - Validation process initiation 





1.2 Organization of The Thesis 
The organization of this thesis is as follows. In section 1.3 a comprehensive literature 
review on two pertaining topics is conducted. First blockchain technology as a disruptive 
innovation is studied through scholars’ work. Next, Real Options theory through academic and 
industrial perspective is review. Later, on chapter 2, we will study the Seller, as one of the main 
decision makers in switching from traditional record keeping to the novel blockchain technology. 
A formal mathematical model along sensitivity analysis is presented. In chapter 3, we study the 
Buyer who shares the mirror utility function as the seller (buyer’s cost contributes to the seller’s 
revenue.) Chapter 4 is dedicated to the Arbitrator as the system operator and how to maximize 
their utilities while maintaining the system integrity without any cost included in our model. 
Chapter 5 presents an extensive numerical analysis to validate the analytical results. On chapter 6, 
we study the arbitrator with operational cost included. Finally, we conclude by discussion and 
conclusion sections, chapter 7 and chapter 8 on what are the implications of implementing 
blockchain technology between participants in a petroleum trading network and who benefits the 






1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.3.1 Literature on Blockchain 
Blockchain technology is a distributed ledger to share information equally among all the 
participants (Wattenhofer, 2017). The information shared included is but not limited to financial 
transaction data, legal contracts, deeds of ownership and identity documentation. The recorded 
information is stored on a ledger that is distributed across every node (i.e. Participant’s computer) 
in a network (Zhang, et al., 2018). The blockchain technology provides the data encryption that 
many entities seek to ensure that the data is not prone to any malicious attacks or breach (Boutelle, 
et al., 2017). Historical transactions in the Blockchain may not be deleted or altered without 
invalidating the chain of hashes since each block is “chained” back to the previous block by 
containing a hash representation of the previous block (Tan, 2017). 
The reason for the interest in Blockchain is its central attributes that provide security, 
anonymity and data integrity without any third-party organization in control of the transactions 
(johansson & Nilsson, 2018). Blockchains allow us to have a distributed peer-to-peer network 
where non-trusting members can interact with each other without a trusted intermediary, in a 
verifiable manner (Sharma, et al., 2017) and (Neudecker & Hartenstein, 2018).  
Furthermore, blockchain technology creates a clear audit trail of time-stamped data as 
documented blocks that could be accessed by authorities for taxation and audit purposes (Sutton 
& Samavi, 2017). Due to the immutability nature of distributed ledger, once the information is 
published, verified and broadcasted, it will become tamper proof and any future attempts to alter 
the history of the ledger would result in total change in the chain which is computationally 
exhaustive and impractical (Liao, 2017). 
Finally, (Cong & He, 2019) studied the impact of blockchain and smart contracts on 





quality and how blockchain technology could affect competition. They argue that information 
distribution through smart contracts could encourage information symmetry by providing 
enhanced entry and competition. However, collusion and consequently, trade disputes are resulted 
of asymmetric information distribution. Later on, they introduce the concept of system operator as 
an arbitrator who may behave malignantly in times.  
1.3.2 Literature on Real Options 
Traditionally, the net present value (NPV) and discounted cash flow (DCF) are heavily 
used in evaluating projects investments under deterministic conditions as suggested by (El-
Temtamy & Gendy, 2014) but investments projects have evolved and now they are faced with 
multiple uncertainties and risks and these traditional methods are insufficient to deal with uncertain 
conditions (Chen, et al., 2007). Irreversibility of projects cannot be characterized by traditional 
approaches since in these traditional techniques assumption of irreversibility is not present 
(Lambert, et al., 2015). Although, in some projects these assumptions are valid, in most of real-
world projects we usually face an irreversible decision. In fact, (Habib & Hasan, 2017) pointed 
out the ability to delay an investment until more information is gathered and uncertainties could 
be reduced, provides the decision maker the opportunity to redesign the decision structure based 
on the information and not take immature action. Unlike traditional approaches, real option 
approach (ROA) gives the flexibility to evaluate different scenarios under high level of uncertainty 
(Damodaran, 2005). 
The term “real options” was first used by a theoretical study of debt policies in (Myers, 
1977). Real option analysis (ROA), refers to viewing the option-based of projects or financial 
assets and it deals with practically implementing option valuation tools and techniques. Option 
valuation was originally developed for the pricing of the financial options. The real options 





is a means to exploit the flexibility inherent in sequential investments as proposed by Adner and 
Levinthal (2004) whereas the latter refer to the available managerial flexibility from “an industrial 
engineering/production management perspective” (Bengtsson, 2001). 
Real Option Approach is one of the most well-known theories for valuation of projects 
under uncertainty. Real Options can be viewed “as the right, but the obligation, to take an action 
(e.g., differing, expanding, contracting or abandoning) at a predetermined cost, called exercise 
price, for a predetermined period of time – the life of the option” (Copeland and Antikarov, 2003). 
There are similarities to Financial call options which an option is defined “An option is a security 
giving the right to buy or sell an asset, subject to certain conditions, within a specific period of 
time” according to Black and Scholes (1973). There are two types of options: American or 
European. If the option is exercised only on a specified future date, it is called “European option” 
whereas if the option can be exercised an any time up to the expiration date it is called “American 
option”. So, an investment opportunity can be viewed as a call option. When a decision maker 
faces an opportunity to invest, they have the option to act now in return for an asset (e.g. Project) 
or postpone the action to future until more information is gathered. Most common of real options 
are the defer, time-to-build, alter operating scale, abandon, switch and growth options according 
to Trigeorgis (1996). 
Valuing of real options according to Copeland an Antikarov (2003) depends on six 
variables: the value of the underlying asset, the exercise price, the time to expiration of the option, 
the uncertainty about the present value, the risk-free rate of interest over the life of the option, the 
dividends that may be paid by the underlying asset. 
According to Kulatilaka and Amram (1999), there are three groups which solution methods 





simulation approach. The PDE approach represents the value of an option and it’s dynamic by a 
partial differential equation and its boundary conditions which can be solved by analytical 
solutions, analytical approximations and numerical solutions. Cortazar et al. (1998) presented a 
model that determine the optimal timing of investment in environmental technologies. They 
assumed that the price follows a geometric Brownian motion and then used Ito calculus to compute 
the total differential of a function stochastic variable and the result was a PDE for the value of the 
real or financial option. In an energy system setting, analytical solutions were first applied to the 
financing of large-scale energy projects and later petroleum engineering projects which were 
considered to be large scale engineering projects utilized this method. PDE were widely used to 
assess the flexibility of power generation and thermal power plants. Most recently, extension to 
pdes were also used to quantify the value of renewable research and development investment, or 
postponing investments in renewable power plants.  
The second method is binomial lattice which is based on optimizing the decision that 
influence future payoffs. By using this method, intermediate values and decisions become visible 
and valuable information about the option and how to deal with complex decision structures are 
provided. Deng and Xia (2006) proposed a stochastic dynamic programming valuation model for 
pricing electricity tolling contracts. 
Third method is Monte Carlo simulation, which is frequently used in literature. In this 
method the optimal investment strategy is calculated at the end of each path and the payoff is 
calculated. The advantage of this method is that it has the capability to handle many real-world 
situations. In Monte Carlo simulation method, different scenarios are randomly generated, and a 





In the following, we mention some of the application areas of applying ROA to a broad 
categories of engineering valuation projects. (Xi-bin Xiao, 2017) studied the problem of airport 
capacity expansion and by applying real options theory through analytical approach. They showed 
whether a real option is required for an airport or not based on the demand uncertainty and reserve 
costs. (Md. Aminul Haque, 2016) showed that by applying a new real options valuation method, 
project values are overestimated if only the commodity price uncertainty is considered instead of 
the joint effect of commodity price and the exchange rate uncertainty. 
(Wilko Rohlfs, 2011) developed a multi-factor real options framework by considering the 
price of electricity, the price of CO2, the cost of CO2 capture, the transporting and storage and 
CCC retrofit investment costs as stochastic variables. They showed that the retrofit design option 
of the power plant seems unattractive by numerical simulation and investments in conventional 
coal-fired power plants with later capture and storage investments at higher costs than in the case 
of a capture-ready pre-installation are found out to be more economical feasible. 
(Ajak Duany Ajak, 2015) proposed the suitability of using real option approach at the mine 
operational level that the decisions are made regularly rather than strategies that are reviewed after 
years. Their result showed how real option can be used in designing multiple pits in multi-zone 
ore deposits to create a switching option between pits and fluctuating commodity prices. The 
results presented the fact that the project’s value increased considerably when flexibility was 
included in the mine design. Their analysis is based on the binomial decision tree. 
(Kuangyuan Zhang, 2016) presented a theoretical two-stage economic model to derive the 
value of metal stockpiling for future processing once the mine is depleted and how it effects the 






 (William R. Binder, 2017) studied the impact of incorporating flexibility in the design of 
Hybrid Energy Systems by considering the option to upgrade or reconfigure the HES 
configurations at some point in the future in response to economic and technological changes that 
are initially unknown and uncertain. (Lixin tian, 2016) set up nuclear energy investment evaluation 
model based on Monte Carlo simulation and real option theory to evaluate the value of a nuclear 
power plant under abandon option (Charles Cheah, 2005) used a discrete-time model to evaluate 
several options in power plants in India to identify and capture flexibilities and concluded that 
ROA can be identified as a superior approach compared to Net Present Value method.  
(joao Marques. Maria Cunha, 2017)  proposed a multi-objective RO framework that 
incorporates the flexible design which is capable of replacing the traditional design of Water 
Distribution Networks, that accounts for uncertainty by taking a broader view of possible future 
options. They used a simulated annealing algorithm to identify Pareto-optimal solutions. 
(Kang, 2016) presented a ROA that uses a binomial lattice model to determine optimal 
design and price decisions for hybrid electric vehicles that maximize expanded net present value 
of profit under gas price uncertainty over time.  
(Jose Guedes, 2016) proposed a clinical approach of an offshore oil development project 
which assumes exploration options, appraisal options, scaling options and abandonment options 
and considers reserve size and price of oil uncertainties and concluded that the available options 







 SELLER AS THE DECISION MAKER 
2.1 Methodology 
There are three participants in the system, trading petroleum as the main commodity 
initially in a traditional setting and later, at an optimal time,	𝑇∗, seller as the decision maker, 
decides to implement, design and switch to a unique blockchain framework due to economic 
circumstances. As a result, all other participant, in order to be able to trade with the (super) seller, 
will follow the decision and become members of the blockchain system.  From point	𝑇∗, all trades 
are done based on the unique blockchain framework. For simplicity, the upstream process of 
petroleum exploration, production and transportation is excluded in this model and only the 
downstream trade is studied. In addition, it is assumed that the buyer and other parties will follow 
the seller in their decision to integrate blockchain technology to trading network. For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume that there is only one major provider (seller) and one major consumer 
(buyer) and one arbitrator who is in charge of resolving the disputes. What distinguishes the 
traditional setting from blockchain framework is the availability of an immutable record of 
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What reduces the number of trade disputes is reduction in fraud and/or error. In a framework where 
maximum degree of accountability is reached, and all participants are vigilant and have access to 
the record of data, there is minimal chance of error and/or fraud, hence lowest probability of trade 
disputes.  
In our framework, the fraud and/or error (whether from seller or buyer) happen at the rate 
of 𝜆 which results in the trade disputes. As previously discussed, trade disputes arise when the 
receiving party fails to acknowledge the violation of the agreement. In every dispute, there are fees 
associated with the filing the disputes. These fees correspond to our 𝐶+, In our model. Commodity 
price, petroleum price, follows a geometric Brownian Motion. The production cost is assumed to 
be constant over period of time and costs associated with filing the protest are functions of oil 
price. As oil price has positive growth rate, at some point in time, 𝑇∗, the seller (oil producer) 
decides to switch to blockchain technology with the hope of reduction in fraud and/or error which 
results in reducing the protest probability. Therefore, using blockchain will increase the settlement 
probability (which results in trade finality) by reducing fraud and/or error.  
 
[ Phase 1        ][  Phase 2                                          ] 
                                  
 
T = 0                                   t = T*      
 
Figure 8 - The timeline before and after blockchain technology 
As discussed earlier, the petroleum traded price is characterized by a geometric Brownian Motion 
with positive drift parameter (growth rate) 𝛼 and volatility 𝜎: 






Where 𝑃0 Is the petroleum price per unit barrel ($/barrel) at a time point t. 𝛼 is the instantaneous 
growth rate of the petroleum price per unit (% per year; > 0) in, while σ  is the instantaneous 
volatility of the petroleum per unit (% per square root of year). Finally, 𝑑𝑡 is the increment of time 
while 𝑑𝑧 is the increment of a standard Wiener process 𝑧(𝑡). That is, 𝑑𝑧 = 𝜀0√𝑑𝑡	 Where 
𝜀0	~	𝑁(0, 1).  
 Furthermore, we assume that for our trading network in question, the protest costs have the 
following relationship with oil price:  
 𝐶>0 = 𝜆𝛽𝑃0	 (2) 
Where	𝐶>,The cost associated with the bid is protests which is proportional to petroleum price 
( $
EFGGHI∗>GJ0H"0
), 𝜆 is the protest rate (#protest/unit time), and 𝛽 is the correlation coefficient	
(𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡	𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒/𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡U)	.	Moreover,	 it	 can	be	verified	 that	 the	costs	associated	with	protest	
follow	a	gbm.	
	 The	rest	of	the	notations	are	given	as	follows:	
𝐼k: Initial entry fee and installations costs to enter a blockchain trading 
𝐶>GJl: Fixed production costs ($/barrels) which is assumed to be constant during the project 
𝐾: Number of barrels of oil traded (barrels) 









2.2 Model Formulation 
The utility function of seller is described as follows. The seller collects revenue from 
selling petroleum to the buyer at price 𝑃 and bears production cost and protest cost. At an optimal 
time, due to the increasing nature of petroleum price, he/she decides to implement blockchain 
technology in order to reduce the cost associated with the protest. This decision results in reducing 
the number of protests which is a direct outcome of reduction in probability of fraud and/or error 
in trades. The seller decides to switch to blockchain technology by spending an initial investment 
cost 𝐼. Therfore the expected value function for production capacity of 𝐾: 
 
𝑉(𝑃0) = 	Max𝐸 [s 𝑒tu0𝐾v𝑃0 − 𝐶>GJl − 𝐶>,x𝑑𝑡 +
y∗
z





As discussed earlier, petroleum price is characterized by a geometric Brownian Motion 
(2). 𝑉U(𝑃) can be characterized as the expected value gained if the company decides to adopt and 
invest in blockchain technology. After implementing the blockchain technology, the value of the 
trading project 𝑉U Obeys Bellman optimality principal:  
 𝜌𝑉U(𝑃)𝑑𝑡 = v𝐾~𝑃 − 𝐶>GJl − 𝐶>,x𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑E[𝑉U(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)𝑒
tu0] (4) 
Equation (4) states that the total return for this project through seller’s perspective consists 
of the net revenue currently generated from oil production and selling plus the future expected 
appreciation in the value of the project.  
After applying Ito’s Lemma on	𝑑𝑉U, the Bellman optimality principle equation (4) yields a 
second order differential equation as follows. 
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To solve the differential equation (5) we first note that a particular solution to equation (5) 
can be verified to be: 
 𝑉U(𝑃) = 	
𝐾𝑃




𝜌 − 𝛼	 (6) 
 
Where a technical condition of 𝜌 − 𝛼 > 0 is assumed as in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Next, a 
homogeneous solution to Equation (5) can be verified to be: 
 𝑉U(𝑃) = 	𝐴k𝑃 + 𝐴U𝑃 (7) 
Where	𝜋k, 𝜋U = ± 

U











− 	𝛼 > 0 is assumed in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and the fundamental quadratic equation is 
as follows,  
 1
2𝜎
U𝜋U + 𝛼 −
1
2𝜎
U 𝜋 − 𝜌 = 0 (9) 
Which is an equation of 𝜋. Hence, general solution to the differential equation: 
 𝑉U(𝑃) = 𝐴k𝑃 + 𝐴U𝑃 	+
𝐾𝑃




𝜌 − 𝛼	 (10) 
In the context of technology competition and innovation through real options theory, 
(Grenadier and Weiss, 1999) defined the boundary conditions for optimal technology upgrade at 
the optimal point as the expected payoff of the upgrade option at the moment the new technological 
innovation is implemented. This approach requires the understanding of the distribution of the 
payoff which may not be known a priori. They assumed that standard normal density and 





Also, to best of the authors knowledge there has not been any scientific approach in 
correctly estimating the expected technological upgrading and improvement when the standard 
and prevailing technology becomes obsolete.  
In another work, (Kauffman and Li, 2005) related the value of the project to value of the 
investment opportunity at the time of technology upgrade and derived the boundary conditions 
based on the relationship between the investment opportunity value and the project value. In our 
framework, we assume that once the firm adopts the new blockchain technology, it will continue 
using the technology forever, hence there is no future option values. The solution to the partial 
differential equation is as follows but since there is no future option the power terms in the value 
function are equal to zero.  
According to Dixit and Pendyck (1994), if the price of oil approaches zero, the value of the 
trading project must approach zero, in other words, 𝑉(0) = 0. Zero is an absorbing barrier for the 
geometric Brownian motion. However since 𝜋U < 0 , the power of 𝑃 goes to infinity as 𝑃 goes to 
zero. To prevent the diverging, we set 𝐴U		As zero. 𝐴U = 0 
The other term, 𝐴k𝑃 Represents a component of 𝑉 to reflect the speculative bubble as 
→ ∞ . According to( Dixit and Pyndeck ,1994) after migrating to blockchain, the firm might make 
the decision to revalue the project above its fundamentals in the future if they expected to be able 
to gain a sufficient capital gain either by upgrading or abandoning the trading or other means. But 
that is not the case in our framework. We assumed as the firm makes the decision to switch to 
blockchain technology, it remains the principal trading framework through the seller perspective, 







This simplifies our solution to the general solution as below: 
 𝑉U(𝑃) = 	
𝐾𝑃




𝜌 − 𝛼	 (11) 
Now let us move on to the phase where the trade is being conducted in a traditional setting, 
without blockchain technology. Similar to phase 2, the petroleum price follows the same gbm as 
blockchain implementation does not change the nature of the commodity being traded. Also, the 
value of the trading network through seller’s perspective obeys Bellman optimality principal:  
 𝜌𝑉k(𝑃)𝑑𝑡 = v𝐾~𝑃 − 𝐶>GJl − 𝐶>,x𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑E[𝑉k(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)𝑒
tu0] (12) 
Similarly, Equation (12) states that the total return for this project consists of the net 
revenue currently generated from the petroleum production and selling plus the expected future 
appreciation in the value of the project. We note that the main difference between equation (4) 
relative to equation (12) is the relationship shown in the following: 
 𝜆U = 𝑏𝜆k		 
𝑏 < 1 
(13) 
That is after implementation of blockchain technology at time point 𝑇∗, the protest rate 
decreases by a factor of b. This results in having larger protest cost before blockchain in 
comparison of after implementing blockchain technology. Therefore, the seller can count of cost 
savings due to the change of fraud/error probabilities.  











This differential equation is subject to the following boundary conditions: 
 𝑉k(𝑃k∗) = 	𝑉U(𝑃k∗) − 𝐼k (15) 
 𝑉k(𝑃k∗) = 	𝑉U(𝑃k∗) (16) 
Where 𝑃k∗ Denotes the optimal threshold level of the petroleum price at which point the 
decision maker (seller) chooses to switch to a unique blockchain technology for trading. Value 
matching and smooth pasting conditions have the following interpretation. The first boundary 
condition ensures the value of the trading network before and after of the migration differs in only 
the investment cost. In other words, stating that the value of the project in Phase 1 at the time of 
change is equal to the value of the project in Phase 2 minus the cost of the technology 
implementation. The smooth pasting conditions ensures that the value function is continuous and 
smooth in the neighborhood of the optimality. 
Employing a process analogous to the one used to derive the solution in the case of 𝑉U(𝑃) 
in Phase 2, it can be verified that the solution to the differential equation (14) is given by  
 𝑉k(𝑃) = 𝐴𝑃 +
𝐾𝑃




𝜌  (17) 
Similarly, as 𝑉k(0) = 0, we conclude that 𝐴 = 0. So, we only have the first term of the 
value of the option to migrate (switch) to blockchain technology with 𝜋k > 1. Using the boundary 
conditions (15) and (16), we can derive the coefficient 𝐴 And the optimal threshold for 























2.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Now we conduct a sensitivity analysis based on the analytical solutions for economic parameters 
as follows. We examine the change of oil price threshold for implementing the blockchain 
technology with respect to investment cost for designing and implementing to the technology, 𝐼k,  
the total number of barrels traded on the trading system, K, the protest rate before implementing 
the blockchain technology, 𝜆k And the cost saving coefficient reflected in reduction in number of 
protests, b. 





𝐾𝜆k𝛽(1 − 𝑏)(𝜋k − 1)
> 0 (20) 
Since the right term of the above expression is always positive, we conclude that as the 
investment cost increases, the optimal threshold for switching to blockchain technology increases. 
In other words, higher implementation costs postpone the implementation project.  




𝐾U𝜆k𝛽(1 − 𝑏)(𝜋k − 1)
< 0 (21) 
This shows as larger number of barrels of oil is traded on the trading network, the 
probability of fraud and/or error increases, resulting in higher number of disputes. Hence, the 
decision maker is incentivized to implement the blockchain technology earlier. Meaning the 
optimal price threshold decreases and the trading quantity increases.  









𝐾𝜆kU𝛽(1 − 𝑏)(𝜋k − 1)
< 0 (22) 
 
This indicates as the protest rate increases, the optimal threshold for oil price decreases. 
This means that if the trading network’s probability of fraud and error is high, resulting in larger 
number of protests, the seller decides to implement blockchain technology sooner rather than later. 




𝐾𝜆k𝛽(1 − 𝑏)U(𝜋k − 1)
> 0	 (23) 
This shows that the price threshold has a positive correlation with costs savings. Meaning 
that in the worst-case scenario, where the blockchain technology will not result in any difference 
for protest rate (𝑏 = 1 → 𝜆U = 𝜆k), the optimal threshold approaches ∞, meaning the decision 






 BUYER AS THE DECISION MAKER 
In this section, we study the buyer as the decision maker. We argue that the buyer’s utility 
function is a mirror of the seller’s. Similar to the previous section, there are three participants in 
the system: the seller, the buyer, and the arbitrator. The buyer is acting as the main decision maker 
which all other participants will follow in the decision to switching to blockchain technology. The 
buyer decides to implement, design and switch to a unique blockchain framework due to economic 
circumstance. From point	𝑇∗, all trades are done based on the unique blockchain framework. For 
simplicity, the upstream process of petroleum exploration, production and transportation is 
excluded in this model and only the downstream trade is studied. Similarly, for the sake of 
simplicity, we assume that there is only one major provider (seller) and one major consumer 
(buyer) and one arbitrator who is in charge of resolving the disputes. What distinguishes the 
traditional setting from blockchain framework is the availability of an immutable record of 
transactions. The implemented blockchain system is identical and shares the same characteristics. 
At some point 𝑇∗, all participants enter blockchain technology and conduct transaction in the 
timestamped environment. In a framework where maximum degree of accountability is reached, 
and all participants are vigilant and have access to the record of data, there is minimal chance of 
error and/or fraud, hence lowest probability of trade disputes. The buyer’s operational cost mostly 
comes from the oil purchase they make and some overhead costs which we assume are negligible. 
The revenue is generated through conducting business with downstream consumers (refineries, 
etc.).  
As for the model characteristics, the same attributions follow. The petroleum price follows a 
geometric Brownian Motion. Similarly, trade disputes happen at a rate of  𝜆 which is the result of 





producer) decides to switch to blockchain technology with the hope of reduction in fraud and/or 
error which results in reducing the protest probability. Therefore, using blockchain will increase 
the settlement probability (which results in trade finality) by reducing fraud and/or error. As 
discussed earlier, the petroleum traded price is characterized by a geometric Brownian Motion 
with positive drift parameter (growth rate) 𝛼 and volatility 𝜎: 
 𝑑𝑃0 = 𝛼𝑃0𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑃0𝑑𝑧 (1) 
Where 𝑃0 Is the petroleum price per unit barrel ($/barrel) at a time point t. 𝛼 is the instantaneous 
growth rate of the petroleum price per unit (% per year; > 0) in, while σ  is the instantaneous 
volatility of the petroleum per unit (% per square root of year). Finally, 𝑑𝑡 is the increment of time 
while 𝑑𝑧 is the increment of a standard Wiener process 𝑧(𝑡). That is, 𝑑𝑧 = 𝜀0√𝑑𝑡	 Where 
𝜀0	~	𝑁(0, 1).  
As previously discussed, the dispute resolution costs follow the 	𝐶>, = 𝜆𝛽𝑃0 Formula.  
Where	𝐶>,The cost associated with the bid is protests which is proportional to petroleum price 
( $
EFGGHI∗>GJ0H"0
), 𝜆 is the protest rate (#protest/unit time), and 𝛽 is the correlation coefficient	
(𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡	𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒/𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡U)	.	Moreover,	 it	 can	be	verified	 that	 the	costs	associated	with	protest	
follow	a	gbm.	
The	rest	of	the	notations	are	given	as	follows:	
𝐼k: Initial entry fee and installations costs to enter a blockchain trading 
𝑃: Fixed revenue ($/barrels) which is assumed to be constant during the project 
𝐾: Number of barrels of oil traded (barrels) 







As can be seen above, the only difference between the model for the seller and for the buyer 
is the source of revenue and costs. They all share the dispute resolution cost, however the sources 
of revenue differ. To prevent repetition, we present the results in the form of discussion.  
Similar to the previous section, there will be an optimal price threshold which the buyer 
makes the decision to switch from traditional record keeping to blockchain technology. We use 
stochastic calculus to apply Ito’s lemma and solve Bellman optimality principal generated 
differentials equations. There are two phases in the model: before and after blockchain. The same 
assumption holds that once the decision maker (here, the buyer) switches to blockchain 






 ARBITRATOR AS THE DECISION MAKER – COST FREE 
4.1 Background 
By	 implementing	 blockchain	 technology,	 the	 overall	 trust	 in	 the	 trading	 network	
evolves	and	participants	are	more	willing	to	send	and	receive	transactions.	Meaning	that	as	
fraud	 and/or	 error	 decreases,	 participants	 are	 willing	 to	 issue	 transactions	 in	 higher	





hence	 the	number	of	 transactions	 increases.	Therefore	𝑛	~1/𝜆	where	𝑛	 is	 the	number	of	
transactions	and	𝜆	is	fraud	and/or	error	rate.		
To clarify, when we mention arbitrator in this paper, we intend to see this entity as a central 
entity with multiple roles. First, as mentioned in the previous section, arbitrator oversees the 
primary stage of dispute resolution. In case of a dispute, there are multiple stages until the dispute 
is completely resolved. However, for the sake of simplicity, we only study the primary level of 
dispute resolution which is conducted by the arbitrator. Next, the same entity is responsible for 
verification of transactions. For instance, when the buyer claims they can supply the funds for the 
specific transaction. In this case, the arbitrator verifies (with traditional or blockchain-based 
methods) that the claim is true. After the transaction has been verified, the other party is confident 
that the transaction is valid and ready to move forward. The application of blockchain technology 
is highlighted in this stage. Moreover, the arbitrator is contracted to design and implement 





of blockchain implementation, 𝐼k. To summarize the arbitrator’s responsibilities and roles in our 
model: 
1. Dispute resolution through traditional and/or Blockchain settings 
2. Transaction verification by overseeing the integrity of the system 
3. Design, implement and maintain a unique Blockchain technology system 
As discussed earlier, implementing blockchain technology results in additional trust 
between participants. In other words, participants can enter the system without fully trusting other 
players since the system is efficient to capture any fraudulent effort. This is the essence of 
Blockchain technology, a trustless system that encourages highest participation without worrying 
about fraud and/or error happening. As the probability of fraud and/or error decreases, seller and 
buyer mentioned in the previous section are more encouraged to entrust their assets and funds to 
the system for conducting transactions. We showed that after blockchain implementation the 
number of transaction increases. This results in more accumulation of transaction fees for arbitrator 
(verifier.) Therefore, the arbitrator can leverage the security and irrefutability of blockchain system 
to encourage other participants to switch to blockchain technology even though he/she is aware 
that by switching one of the main sources of revenue (dispute resolution costs paid by protester) 
will be diminished. We argue that by implementing blockchain technology, the arbitrator will 
receive: 
1. The investment payment for designing, implementing and deploying Blockchain 
2. The increased payment for surged number of transactions which corresponds to higher 





The gain profit due to these two sources, under certain conditions, will compensate the loss 
due to the reduction of dispute resolution costs by increased demand for transaction verification 
directed from either seller or buyer.  
The arbitrator, in the trading system, may have incentive to act maliciously. In the trading 
framework, business arbitrators may favor a client and double spending attacks in traditional 
online trades are examples of abnormal behavior of arbitrators. In other scenarios, the arbitrator in 
our trading system, may act faithfully, but due to the fraud and/or error done by either seller or 
buyer, the verification process (report submission) does not reflect the ground truth. Nevertheless, 
the outcome of the trade is the same in both cases, whether the arbitrator conducts vicious behavior 
or seller and/or buyer act untruthfully.  
In our framework, the fraud and/or error (whether from seller or buyer) happen at the rate 
of 𝜆 which results in the trade disputes. As previously discussed, trade disputes arise when the 
receiving party fails to acknowledge the violation of the agreement. In every dispute, there are fees 
associated with the filing the disputes. These fees correspond to our 𝐶+, In our model. Commodity 
price, petroleum price, follows a geometric Brownian Motion as suggested by (Postali & Picchetti, 
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2006). The production cost is assumed to be constant over time and costs associated with filing 
the protest are functions of oil price.   
4.2 Methodology 
There are three participants in the system, trading petroleum as the main commodity 
initially in a traditional setting and later, at an optimal time,	𝑇∗, the decision maker decides to 
switch a unique blockchain framework due to economic circumstances. As a result, all other 
participant, will follow the decision and become members of the blockchain system.  From 
point	𝑇∗, all trades are done based on the unique blockchain framework. For simplicity, the 
upstream process of petroleum exploration, production and transportation is excluded in this model 
and only the downstream trade is studied. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is only 
one major provider (seller), one major consumer (buyer), and one arbitrator who oversees dispute 
resolution and transaction verification. What distinguishes the traditional setting from blockchain 
framework is the availability of an immutable record of transactions. Every transaction is 
timestamped, and the underlying source is clearly expressed. What reduces the number of bid 
protests is reduction in fraud and/or error. In a framework where maximum degree of 
accountability is reached, and all participants are vigilant and have access to the record of data, 
there is minimal chance of error and/or fraud, hence lowest probability of trade disputes.  
Oil price with positive growth rate (Xu, 2006) at some point in time, 𝑇∗, the blockchain 
technology will be implemented with the hope of reduction in fraud and/or error which results in 
reducing the protest probability. Therefore, using blockchain will increase the settlement 
probability and trade finality by reducing fraud and/or error. Furthermore, there is a fixed 
transaction fee t for every instance of transaction verification done by the arbitrator. This fee as 





Reitwießner, 2018). We hypothesis that as the probability of fraud and/or error decreases (by 
deploying the Blockchain technology) the overall trust in the trading network progresses and 
participants are more likely to trade with each other. Hence, the number of transactions which 
affects accumulated transaction fees increases. Although this is considered a charge for seller and 
buyer, increasing the total number of transactions will result in growing profit which surpasses the 
total transaction fees.    
Now let us introduce some notations: 
𝜆: fraud and/or error rate 
𝐼k: Initial entry fee and installations costs to enter a blockchain trading 
𝐾: Number of barrels of oil traded (barrels) 
𝜌: the annual discount rate for money. Here we use the Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
(WACC) 
𝑡: fixed transaction verification fee ($/transaction.barrel) 
𝑛: number of transactions (#transaction) 
𝜃: equality coefficient 
In our model the petroleum price is characterized by a geometric Brownian Motion with positive 
drift parameter (growth rate) 𝛼 and volatility 𝜎: 
Where 𝑃0 Is the petroleum price per unit barrel ($/barrel) at a time point t. 𝛼 is the instantaneous 
growth rate of the petroleum price per unit (% per year; > 0) in, while σ  is the instantaneous 
volatility of the petroleum per unit (% per square root of year). Finally, 𝑑𝑡 is the increment of 





time while 𝑑𝑧 is the increment of a standard Wiener process 𝑧(𝑡). That is, 𝑑𝑧 = 𝜀0√𝑑𝑡	 Where 
𝜀0	~	𝑁(0, 1).  
 Furthermore, we assume that for our trading network in question, the protest costs which 
correspond to one of the main sources of revenue for the arbitrator have the following relationship 
with oil price: 
 𝐶>0 = 𝜆𝛽𝑃0	 (2) 
Where	𝐶>,The cost associated with the bid is protests which is proportional to petroleum price 
( $
EFGGHI∗>GJ0H"0
), 𝜆 is the protest/fraud/error rate (#protest/unit time), and 𝛽 is the correlation 
coefficient	(𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡	𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒/𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡U)	.	Moreover,	it	can	be	verified	that	the	costs	associated	with	
protest	follow	a	gbm.	
 Furthermore, we argue that number of transactions is negatively correlated with the fraud 
and/or error rate. As before, as the trade finality and irrefutability increases meaning fraud and/or 
error rate decreases, participants are more likely to send transactions, hence the number of 
transactions increases. In other words: 
 𝑛~
1















0 < 𝑏 < 1	
Hence, 𝑛U > 𝑛k 
We are not studying the scenario where the arbitrator acts maliciously as it would break 





malicious behavior of arbitrator is outside the scope of my paper. In other words, whenever fraud 
and/or error occurs, it is conducted from either the buyer or the seller or both parties. Therefore, 
we are only going to study the scenario where the fraud and/or error is occurred because 
participants other than the arbitrator acted maliciously. 
In our simplified trading model, we have: 
 𝑈 = 𝐶>0 + 𝑛	 ∙ 𝐶0±  (26) 
Where 𝐶>0 And 𝐶0± Are arbitrator’s revenue. Although in our model, the arbitrator’s 
revenue from dispute resolution decreases as the system switches to blockchain technology, 
~𝐶>0U 	< ~𝐶>0k (which is due to less disputes) the increase in number of transactions as a result 
of higher participation in the network (due to increase trust in a secure, immutable and irrefutable 
record) will result in accruing larger sum of transaction fees: 
 ~𝐶>0U 	< ~𝐶>0k And 𝑛U > 𝑛k (27) 
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the number of transactions increases due to higher trust in 
the system by participants. Therefore, the arbitrator can collect increased amount of transaction 
verification fees by implementing the blockchain technology. The increase in transactions numbers 
and fees subsequently, compensate for the decrease in dispute resolution payments. We are going 
to study the conditions under which the arbitrator by switching to Blockchain technology not only 
does not lose profit, but also experiences increase in revenue. This incentivizes the incorporation 






4.3 Model Formulation  
In this section we are going to present the mathematical formulation of investment 
valuation through the arbitrator’s perspective. The arbitrator collects revenue from dispute 
resolution and transaction verification fees corresponding to a price 𝑃. At an optimal time, due to 
the increasing nature of petroleum price, blockchain technology is implemented in order to reduce 
the cost associated with the protest. This decision results in reducing the number of protests which 
is a direct outcome of reduction in probability of fraud and/or error in trades. Consequently, the 
expected value function for trading capacity of 𝐾 through arbitrator’s perspective is: 
 
𝑉(𝑃0) = 	Max𝐸 [s 𝑒tu0𝐾v𝐶>0 + 𝑛k	 ∙ 𝐶0±x𝑑𝑡 +
y∗
z





Using notation for phase one and phase two (before and after blockchain implementation) and 
utilizing the Bellman principal of optimality, we formulate the value function of the trading 
network through arbitrator’s perspective. As discussed earlier, petroleum price is characterized by 
a geometric Brownian Motion 𝑑𝑃0 = 𝛼𝑃0𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑃0𝑑𝑧. 𝑉U(𝑃) can be characterized as the expected 
value gained if the company decides to adopt and invest in blockchain technology. 
 𝜌𝑉U(𝑃)𝑑𝑡 = v𝐾~𝐶>0 + 𝑛U	 ∙ 𝐶0±x𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑E[𝑉U(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)𝑒tu0] (29) 
Equation (30) states that the total return for this project through arbitrator’s perspective 
consists of the net revenue currently generated from dispute resolution payments and transaction 
verification fees plus the future expected appreciation in the value of the project.  
After applying Ito’s Lemma on	𝑑𝑉U, the Bellman optimality principle equation (30) yields 








U𝑃U𝑉U + 𝛼𝑃𝑉U − 𝜌𝑉U + 	𝐾~𝐶>0 + 𝑛	U ∙ 𝐶0± = 0 (30) 
The optimality equation results in a second-order differential equation with homogenous 
and non-homogenous solutions. To solve the differential equation (31) we first note that a 
particular solution can be verified to be: 
 𝑉U(𝑃) = 	
𝐾𝐶>0
𝜌 − 𝛼 +
𝐾(𝑛U ∙ 𝐶0±)
𝜌  (31) 
Where a technical condition of 𝜌 − 𝛼 > 0 is assumed as in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Next, a 
homogeneous solution to Equation (10) can be verified to be: 
 𝑉U(𝑃) = 	𝐴𝑃 + 𝐴²𝑃 (32) 
Where	𝜋k, 𝜋U = ± 

U
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− 	𝛼 > 0 is assumed in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and the fundamental quadratic equation is 
similar to the previous section.   
Which is an equation of 𝜋. Hence, general solution to the differential equation: 
 𝑉U(𝑃) = 𝐴𝑃 + 𝐴²𝑃 	+
𝐾𝐶>0
𝜌 − 𝛼 +
𝐾(𝑛U ∙ 𝐶0±)
𝜌  (33) 
In the context of technology competition and innovation through real options theory, 
(Grenadier & Weiss, 1997) defined the boundary conditions for optimal technology upgrade at the 
optimal point as the expected payoff of the upgrade option at the moment the new technological 
innovation is implemented. This approach requires the understanding of the distribution of the 
payoff which may not be known a priori. They assumed that standard normal density and 





Also, to best of the authors knowledge there has not been any scientific approach in 
correctly estimating the expected technological upgrading and improvement when the standard 
and prevailing technology becomes obsolete.  
In another work, (Kauffman & Li, 2005) related the value of the project to value of the 
investment opportunity at the time of technology upgrade and derived the boundary conditions 
based on the relationship between the investment opportunity value and the project value. In our 
framework, we assume that once the firm adopts the new blockchain technology, it will continue 
using the technology forever, hence there is no future option values. The solution to the partial 
differential equation is as follows but since there is no future option the power terms in the value 
function are equal to zero.  
According to (Pindyck & Dixit, 1994), if the price of oil approaches zero, the value of the 
trading project must approach zero, in other words, 𝑉(0) = 0. Zero is an absorbing barrier for the 
geometric Brownian motion. However since 𝜋U < 0 , the power of 𝑃 goes to infinity as 𝑃 goes to 
zero. To prevent the diverging, we set 𝐴²		As zero. 𝐴² = 0 
The other term, 𝐴𝑃 Represents a component of 𝑉 to reflect the speculative bubble as 
→ ∞ . According to (Pindyck & Dixit, 1994)after migrating to blockchain, the firm might make 
the decision to revalue the project above its fundamentals in the future if they expected to be able 
to gain enough capital gain either by upgrading or abandoning the trading or other means. But that 
is not the case in our framework. We assumed as the firm makes the decision to switch to 
blockchain technology, it remains the principal trading framework through the seller perspective, 
hence there is no expected value of the trading above its fundamentals in the future, hence 𝐴 = 0. 





 𝑉U(𝑃) = 	
𝐾𝐶>0
𝜌 − 𝛼 +
𝐾(𝑛U ∙ 𝐶0±)
𝜌  (31) 
To unify with our notations in the previous section, we have ~𝐶>0U = 𝜆U𝛽𝑃0. Hence, 
 𝑉U(𝑃) =
𝐾𝐶>0




𝜌 − 𝛼 +
𝐾(𝜃/𝑏)(𝑛k ∙ 𝐶0±)
𝜌 	 (32) 
By carefully examining the value function of the project, we can see, the value of the 
project is positively correlated with petroleum price and the number of transactions in the system. 
As price of petroleum increases, arbitrator’s revenue increases. This highlights the importance of 
the price volatility, number of transactions, volume of the commodity being traded in the system 
(𝐾, n & P.) 
Now let us move on to the phase 1 where the trade is being conducted in a traditional 
setting, without blockchain technology. Similar to phase 2, the petroleum price follows the same 
gbm as blockchain implementation does not change the nature of the commodity being traded. 
Also, the value of the trading network through seller’s perspective obeys Bellman optimality 
principal:  
 𝜌𝑉k(𝑃)𝑑𝑡 = v𝐾~𝐶>0 + 𝑛	k ∙ 𝐶0±x𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑E[𝑉k(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)𝑒tu0] (33) 
Where 	
𝜆U = 𝑏𝜆k	And	𝑛U =
𝜃
𝑏 	𝑛k	 
Where	𝜃 > 1		and	0 < 𝑏 < 1	
The optimality principal states that the total value of the trading project through arbitrator’s 
perspective is comprised the total revenue that arbitrator makes (by dispute resolution, verification 
fees, etc.) And the future appreciation of the project. Using Ito’s lemma, a partial differential 








U𝑃U𝑉k + 𝛼𝑃𝑉k − 𝜌𝑉k +	v𝐾~𝐶>0 + 𝑛	k ∙ 𝐶0±x = 0 (34) 
 
 𝑉k(𝑃k∗) = 	𝑉U(𝑃k∗) − 𝐼k (35) 
 𝑉k(𝑃k∗) = 	𝑉U(𝑃k∗) (36) 
Where 𝑃k∗ Denotes the optimal threshold level of the petroleum price at which point the decision 
maker chooses to switch to a unique blockchain technology for trading. Equation (35) is the value 
matching which ensures the value of the trading network before and after of the migration differs 
in only the investment cost. In other words, stating that the value of the project in Phase 1 at the 
time of change is equal to the value of the project in Phase 2 minus the cost of the technology 
implementation. Equation (36), smooth pasting conditions ensures that the value function is 
continuous and smooth in the neighborhood of the optimality. 
One can verify that the general solution to the partial differential equation is as follows: 
 𝑉k(𝑃) = 𝐴´𝑃 + 𝐴µ𝑃 +
𝐾𝐶>0
𝜌 − 𝛼 +
𝐾(𝑛k ∙ 𝐶0±)
𝜌  (37) 
As 𝑉k(0) = 0	we conclude that 𝐴µ = 0 (corresponding to 𝜋U < 0. ) Therefore, we only have 
the first term of the value of the option to migrate to blockchain technology with 𝜋k > 1. Hence 
the solution for the value of the trading project through arbitrator’s perspective in the first phase 
is: 
 𝑉k(𝑃) = 𝐴´𝑃 +
𝐾𝐶>0
𝜌 − 𝛼 +
𝐾(𝑛k ∙ 𝐶0±)
𝜌  (38) 
Utilizing the boundary conditions stated above, we can solve for the optimal price 
threshold, 𝑃∗, and the exponential coefficient, 𝐴´.   






Results in  
 
 𝐴´ =








With a condition 𝜃 > 𝑏 
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
Now we conduct a sensitivity analysis based on the analytical solutions for economic parameters 
as follows. We examine the change in oil price threshold for implementing the blockchain 
technology with respect to investment cost for designing and implementing to the technology, 𝐼k 
And the fraud and/or error rate before implementing the blockchain technology, 𝜆k 









Since the right term of the above expression is always negative, we conclude that as the 
investment payments to the system implementor increases, the optimal threshold for switching to 
blockchain technology decreases. In other words, higher implementation investment is an 









[−𝜌𝐼k + 𝐾𝑛k𝐶0±(𝜃 − 𝑏)]
𝐾𝜆kU𝛽𝜌(1 − 𝑏)(𝜋k − 1)
𝜋k(𝜌 − 𝛼)
< 0 (42) 
For reasonable investment costs and high transaction values, this indicates as the fraud 
and/or error increases, the optimal threshold for oil price to switch to blockchain decreases. This 
means that if the trading network’s probability of fraud and error is high, resulting in larger number 
of protests, we need to implement blockchain technology sooner rather than later. Also, this refers 
to lower number of transactions as 𝑛	~	1/𝜆 states that higher fraud and/or rate results in less 





 NUMERICAL ANALYSIS FOR THE ARBITRATOR’S MODEL 
In this section we numerically illustrate some of the key features of our arbitrator as the decision 
maker model. This numerical example is manly focused on validating the findings for the arbitrator 
mathematical model.  
1. Parameter values: Let us first present the parameter values used in this section. Even 
though these values are hypothetical, to be realistic numbers, we have consulted the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration as well as others (e.g., Croghan, et al., 2017; 
(Fasanya & Onakoya, 2013)). These are summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1 – Parameters and corresponding values  
Parameters Numerical values 
Trading quantity K 5000 barrels 
Investment cost I  $100,000 
Annual discount rate 𝝆 0.05 
Annualized growth rate of oil price 𝜶 0.03 
Annualized volatility of oil price 𝝈 0.25 
Fraud and/or error rate 𝝀𝟏 10 
Fraud and/or error rate 𝝀𝟐 2 
Blockchain system efficiency coefficient b 0.2 
Fixed transaction fee t $0.3/transaction 






2. The switching decision: By applying the parameter values to Equations (15), (21), (23), 
(25), the threshold value of 𝑃∗ ($/barrel) as well as the functions of 𝑉k(𝑃) and 𝑉U(𝑃) can 
be calculated. The numerical results are summarized in Table 2.  
Table 2 - Numerical results for switching decision 
Decision variables  Numerical values 
𝝅𝟏  1.28507 
𝑷∗  $97/barrel 
𝑨𝟑 −422511 
𝑽𝟏(𝑷) −422511𝑷k.Uµz´ + 2.5 × 10²𝑷 + 1.2 × 10² 
























3. In Figure 10, the threshold of 𝑃∗ Is depicted with respect to the volatility of the petroleum 
price. This threshold increases as the price of petroleum becomes more volatile, which 
indicates that a higher degree of volatility will delay the switching decision.  
4. In Figure 11, the threshold of 𝑃∗ Is depicted with respect to the growth rate of the petroleum 
price. The threshold increases exponentially as the growth rate increases. This implies that 
higher growth rate implies postponing the switching to Blockchain technology.  
 
5. In Figure 12, the threshold of 𝑃∗ Is depicted with respect to the investment payment to 
implement and maintain blockchain technology. As seen above, higher investment 
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reasonable that the higher incentive to switch to the new technology would be, the earlier 





6. In Figure 13, the threshold of 𝑃∗ Is illustrated with respect to the trading capacity. As shown 
above, we can observe that as the trading capacity increases, the threshold increases as 
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increases in trading capacity will not affect the optimal threshold and the threshold will 
peter out.  
 
7. In Figure 14, the threshold of 𝑃∗ Is illustrated with respect to the fraud and/or error rate, 𝜆. 
As we can see, as the fraud/error rate increases, the threshold decreases. It is interesting to 
note that as the fraud/error rate increases, meaning a smaller number of transactions will 
happen, the arbitrator favors switching to blockchain as early as possible. As we can see, 
the theoretical upper bound of fraud/error rate will result of not waiting at all and 

























is no fraud/error happening on the trading system, corresponding to 𝜆 → 0, the firm will 
never switch to blockchain technology as 𝑃∗ → ∞.  
8. In Figure 15, we have illustrated the historical petroleum price movements to depict 
graphically how the price moves and how we identify an optimal threshold for switching 




Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration  
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration  
 





 ARBITRATOR AS THE DECISION MAKER – COST INCLUDED 
In this chapter we will study the arbitrator as the decision maker, similar to the previous 
chapter, however, costs associated with labor and overhead are included as a parameter on the 
value function. All the notations and assumptions are the same except that there is an associated 
cost with verification process which arbitrator needs to incur. The new utility function is as 
follows: 
 𝑈 = 𝐶>0 + 𝑛	 ∙ 𝐶0± − 𝐶Â  (27) 
We assume that there is an equilibrium for this cost. Before implementing blockchain, 
number of transactions are not as large as after implementing blockchain (due to reasoning 
mentioned in the previous sections) Hence, one might think that there is less labor cost for 
transaction verification from the arbitrator perspective. However, as mentioned before, number of 
disputes are higher before implementing blockchain, hence the costs associated with dispute 
resolution will compensate lower transaction verification costs. Therefore, we assume that 
operational and labor costs for the arbitrator is fixed throughout the project (i.e. Before and after 
implementing blockchain)  
With that being said, the new value function is as follows: 
 
𝑉(𝑃0) = 	Max𝐸 [s 𝑒tu0𝐾v𝐶>0 + 𝑛k	 ∙ 𝐶0± − 𝐶Âx𝑑𝑡
y∗
z












Using dynamic programming, bellman’s optimality principals for after blockchain is as 
follows:  
 𝜌𝑉U(𝑃)𝑑𝑡 = v𝐾~𝐶>0 + 𝑛U	 ∙ 𝐶0± − 𝐶Âx𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑E[𝑉U(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)𝑒tu0] (44) 
   
After applying Ito’s lemma, solving the differential equation, similar conditions to the previous 
sections, we have the solution for the value of the project as follows: 
 𝑉U(𝑃) = 	
𝐾𝐶>0




𝜌  (45) 
For the first phase, again similar to the previous section, we have the bellman optimality principle:  
 𝜌𝑉U(𝑃)𝑑𝑡 = v𝐾~𝐶>0 + 𝑛k	 ∙ 𝐶0± − 𝐶Âx𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑E[𝑉U(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)𝑒tu0] (46) 
   
Using respective boundary conditions, solving the differential equation yields:  
𝑉k(𝑃) = 𝐴Ã𝑃 +
𝐾𝐶>0




𝜌  (47) 
Boundary conditions are similar to the previous section. To obtain the optimal price threshold and 
𝐴Ã, we have:  
 
𝐴Ã = 𝐴´ =







[−𝜌𝐼k + 𝐾𝑛k ∙ 𝐶0±(𝜃 − 𝑏) − 𝐾𝐶Â]














This shows that as the efficiency of the blockchain system increases, the participants are 
encouraged to submit higher frequency of transactions even though there is a transaction 
verification fee associated to each transaction. The verification fee will be compensated by the 
savings done by reducing fraud and/or error.  
By carefully studying the optimal threshold for switching to blockchain technology which 
corresponds to maximization of arbitrator’s utility, we conclude that investment cost is an 
incentive to switching to blockchain technology for arbitrators. As investment payment to the 
arbitrator (as being responsible for system implementation) increases, the optimal threshold for 
switching to blockchain technology decreases. This is well-matched with reality as investment 
sum paid by seller and/or buyer is an incentive for arbitrator to participate in blockchain 
implementation decision making.  
We observed that as the participants migrate their trading network to Blockchain system, 
costs saving associated with dispute resolution decreases exponentially. Next, we saw that since 
the dispute resolution payments are one of the main sources of revenue for the arbitrator, switching 
to Blockchain technology, under specific economic conditions might seem not practical and 
feasible for the arbitrator. However, we identify another source of arbitrator’s revenue, the 
transaction verification fee. We argued that as the system becomes more reliable and the trading 
chain becomes irrefutable by integrating blockchain technology, the probability of fraud and/or 
error decreases. This results in fewer disputes and higher trust of participants in the system. When 
both seller and buyer see that the trading system is reliable and trade finality is maximal, they tend 





arbitrator. Therefore, the loss of dispute resolution payments by switching to Blockchain is 
compensated by gain due to increase in transactions frequency and subsequently larger sum of 
transaction verification fees in a finite horizon. The rational for increasing in number of transaction 
after Blockchain technology can be stated as number of transaction is extremely dependent on 




Where 𝜃 is a constant and 𝜆 is fraud and/or error rates.  
𝜆U < 𝜆k → 𝑛U > 𝑛k 
And the rate of increase in number of transactions is 1/𝑏. 
All findings in the mathematical models are based on the fact that blockchain technology 
indeed lives up to its promises as to increase trust among participants by providing an immutable 
track of records. As we concluded, the arbitrator can positively take advantage of this feature to 
advertise blockchain as a sustainable solution that provides transparency and irrefutability. As the 
interactions among participants become more complex, the number of participants increase, from 
a game theory perspective, it is not trivial to reason that blockchain technology encourages 
information symmetry, fair competition, and increase in trust. As (Cong & He, 2019) pointed out, 
using smart contracts which are the at the core of blockchain along with the immutable record, 
might result in collision and further mistrust complications. In our simple, three-participant model, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the system arbitrator can profit from switching to blockchain even 
though less disputes happen. As for the implications on participants interaction, switching to 
blockchain technology could be considered as a win-win-win solution for all the participants under 
certain economic conditions. These conditions have been connected to the underlying asset price, 





Options theory to find the optimal timing of decision making for the participants. We hope that 
this work provides insight on how disruptive and innovative technologies could help businesses 
make better data-driven decisions under uncertainty. As for future directions, one can study the 
inter-relations between all three participants at once and not in isolation to identify the winner(s) 
or possible loser(s) in the decision of switching to blockchain technology.  
We also should mention that filing disputes from either seller or buyer could be categorized 
into three categories: frivolous, unintentional errors, and strategic disputes. By strategic disputes, 
we refer to Melese (2010), where entities file disputes because of trade regret or postponing trade 
execution and finality. Melese (2010) mentioned about these efforts coming from entities who are 
not happy or satisfied with already accepted contract or economic conditions have changed their 
minds. They might have found better deals which would like to terminate the contract and switch 
to better deals. In this article we mainly focused on strategic disputes, since blockchain technology 
discourages entities to file disputes for the purpose of postponement of trades.  
Moving to a realistic example of dispute arbitration, International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSDI) is established in 1966 for legal dispute resolution and 
conciliation between international investors. This entity, which is an international organization, is 
part of the World Bank Group, and an autonomous, multilateral specialized institution to 
encourage international flow of investment and mitigate non-commercial risks. This organization 
can be identified as an immediate example of the arbitrator mentioned in this work, which is 
responsible for dispute resolution between states, in a multi-national capacity.  
(Khor 2012) mentions, as an instance, an ICSDI counsel awarded a judgment of $1.8 billion 
for Occidental Petroleum against the government of Ecuador. Furthermore, Ecuador had to pay 





country annulled a contract with the oil firm on the grounds that it violated a clause that the 
company would not sell its rights to another firm without permission. The tribunal agreed the 
violation took place but judged that the annulment was not fair and equitable treatment to the 
company.”   
According to Wikipedia, another example is “Irish oil firm Tullow Oil took the Ugandan 
government to court in November 2012 after value-added tax (VAT) was placed on goods and 
services the firm purchased for its operations in the country. The Ugandan government 





















Due to high frequency and large volume, petroleum trades are susceptive to misreporting which 
would result in trades disputes. In this thesis, we studied a petroleum trading network consisting 
of three participants: the seller, the buyer, and the arbitrator. First part of the paper was dedicated 
to study the seller and the buyer. We developed mathematical models that validate the hypothesis 
that blockchain technology could help increase trust and maximize participants utilities function 
if studied each player in isolation. Second portion of the paper we focused on evaluating the trading 
network from the arbitrator perspective. In each transaction network, the arbitrator facilitates the 
transaction verification and reporting. We argued by implementing a blockchain technology, the 
number of trade disputes which are resulted by fraud and/or error would decrease. The rational for 
this is since blockchain technology offers an immutable record of transactions, trust in the system 
would increase which would result in higher accumulation of transaction verification fees for the 
arbitrator. Hence, arbitrator can leverage this and compensate for decrease in dispute resolution 
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